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Wheat differentiation and response to policy reform in the EU 
Bruno Henry de Frahan, Christian Tritten and Daniel Sumner
1 
Abstract:  Agenda 2000 reduces the bias that favors low quality wheat production in European Union (EU), 
but also improves access for imports of high quality wheat.  Therefore, this paper uses a partial equilibrium 
displacement model that differentiates wheat according to its origin and end use to investigate the impact of 
Agenda 2000 on wheat supply and demand in France. 
 
To investigate the impact of Agenda 2000 on the European Union (EU) wheat supply and demand, this study 
uses a partial equilibrium displacement model that differentiates wheat according to its origin and end use.  
Several policy changes have reduced wheat price in the EU.  These include the Agenda 2000 cut in the EU 
cereal intervention price and the special deal struck by the EU and United States (US) within the framework of 
the Uruguay Round agreement stating that the duty-paid price for imports into the EU should not exceed the 
intervention price by more than 55%.  The EU reference price for cereal imports is now at the CIF world price 
of top-grade wheat and durum, eliminating market protection for high-quality milling and durum wheat.  We 
expect that these duty adjustments would encourage imports from North America and put pressure on milling 
premiums for EU producers of high-quality wheat.  On the other hand, the cut in the EU cereal intervention 
price and the use of stricter intervention criteria on wheat is expected to encourage European producers to shift 
their production towards a higher quality of wheat. 
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Most of the past studies that have considered product differentiation to analyze the effects of policy changes 
have allowed for imperfect substitutability in terms of origin only and include Abbot and Paarlberg (1986), 
Babula (1987), Figueroa and Webb (1986), Honma (1983), Johnson, Grennes and Thursby (1977), Penson 
and Babula (1988), Sarris (1983), Suryana (1986) and Webb, Figueroa, Wecker and McCalla (1989).  
Some more recent studies have in addition allowed differentiation by end uses and include Alston, Gray and 
Sumner (1994), Haley (1995) and Sumner, Alston and Gray (1994).  All of these studies have applied the 
Armington framework to incorporate these two types of differentiation in the demand system of their models 
despite the separability and homotheticity restrictions implied by this framework (Alston, Carter, Green and 
Pick, 1990). 
 
To avoid these strong Armington restrictions, this study uses an almost ideal demand system (AIDS) to 
differentiate wheat according to its origin and end use in a three-stage budgeting procedure.  To analyze 
differential effects of changing either reference prices or intervention prices in the European Community, de 
Gorter and Meilke (1987) have also used an AIDS specification but have limited its application on 
distinguishing domestic and import supplies only.  To analyze the U.S. Export Enhancement Program, Haley 
(1995) has also used a three-stage procedure to differentiate wheat by end use and by country of origin but 
has applied it with the Armington specification.  This study also differentiates wheat by end use to characterize 
the EU institutional and world price transmission and the domestic wheat supply system.  In sum, the novelty of 
this study is using a complete model that differentiates the EU wheat market according to sources of supply 
and end uses by (1) differentiating wheat demand according to its end use in the second stage and according to 
its origin in the third stage of a three-stage budgeting procedure, (2) departing from the Armington restrictions 
by using an AIDS specification and (3) introducing end-use differentiation in the price transmission and supply   4
system of the model.  Because of data limitations, this model is applied to the French wheat market for which 
supply and demand could be disaggregated by end use and origin. 
This paper is organized as following.  First, from annual series of market, intervention, reference, world prices 
and excess supplies, institutional support price transmission elasticities are estimated for France, for each wheat 
category, and for the main substitutes in wheat consumption and main competing products in production using 
a varying-parameter transmission model suggested in Surry (1992).  Second, the behavioral model from which 
the partial equilibrium displacement model is drawn is briefly presented.  Third, constant own- and cross-price 
elasticities of demand and supply are estimated for France for each wheat category, from annual series of 
market prices and reconstructed consumption and production volumes.  Fourth, a partial equilibrium 
displacement model (Davis and Espinoza, 1998) represents the behavior of the European country's markets 
for wheat of different origins and end uses and incorporates the estimated elasticities and other parameters.  
Fifth, cereal intervention price cuts and arable area direct acreage payment increases as planned in the Agenda 
2000 are simulated on these markets subject to the market access and export competition provisions agreed in 




The data used in this study is collected from years 1980 until 1999 and come from different sources, including 
the European statistics office, EUROSTAT, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Canadian 
Wheat Board (CWB), International Grain Commission (IGC), the French statistics office, INSEE, the French 
cereal professional organization ONIC and several other private organizations.  The major difficulty in a study   5
such as this one is to obtain quality differentiated information when the data only contains undifferentiated 
information.  Quality differentiated information can be inferred by recouping information at different levels.  
First of all, by end-use.  Industrial uses require starch rich wheat, which are a main characteristic of class 2 
wheats.  Bread making in France uses classes E, 1 and 2 wheat while bakery and feed use class 3 wheat.  
Second of all by availability.  Surveys have been conducted which indicate which varieties have been planted 
and which qualities of wheats have resulted from those cultures.  Third, by origin of imports and exports.  
Here, trading firm expert knowledge enabled us to approximate the quality of imports and exports to each 
origin and destination country according to their needs in different qualities.  Putting this information together, 
and making additional assumptions of the quality distribution of stocks, enabled the quantities to be distributed 
in different quality classes.  French market prices are inferred by the export price at different ports.  Indeed, 
certain ports specialize in certain qualities of wheat. For example, Eure et Loire specializes in class 1, Rouen in 
class 2 and Champagne in class 3 wheat shipments.  No prices could be found for class E wheat since it is not 
exported, and because the market for the French product of this class is too marginal.  Therefore the price 
considered for this wheat is a quantity weighted average of the American DNS and Canadian CWRS prices. 
The Wheat Market 
Since the late eighties, wheat is recognized in the economic literature as a differentiated product according to its 
characteristics, which define its end-uses, for example see Veeman (1987), Larue (1991).  Following the 
USDA and the CWB, ONIC introduced quality standards and labeling to establish differentiated market 
niches for wheat.  Table 1 shows representative categories of wheat in France, the United-States and Canada 
classified according to biochemical, physical and end-use criteria. 
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Table 1 Representative categories of wheat in France, the United-States and Canada 
  Hard  Soft  Feed 
  Spring  Winter  Winter  White  Wheat 
Country           
France  Elite (E)  1 
a  2 
b  2  3 
c 
USA  DNS, HRS  HRW  SRW  WW   
Canada  CWRS  CWRW  CESRW  CEWW   
Reference variety  DNS  HRW  SRW    Maize 
d 
            Criterion           
Protein  ‡13%  11-13%  10-11%  10.5-11.5%  <10.5% 
W 
e  ‡300  ‡160  ‡130  ‡130  - 
Hagberg 
e  ‡220  ‡220  ‡180  ‡180  - 




  Feed 
Quality 
f  High  Medium  Low    Feed 
a Also referred to as Superior Bread Making Wheat 
b Also referred to as Common Bread Making Wheat 
c Also referred to as Other Usage Wheat 
d Also FOB Rouen and FOB London 
e W (bread-making strength) measured in 10
-4 joules, Hagberg measured in seconds 
f Larue, 1991 
 
Figure 1 to Figure 3 show the evolution of prices of the different categories of wheat in the French market since 
1980.  Figure 1 shows that prices of class 1, 2 and 3 wheats evolve closely together, price of elite wheat is 
between 50 to 100% higher than the other wheats and the price of Durum wheat fluctuates between the prices 
of elite wheat and the other wheats. 
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1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Durum Class E Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
 
1 All prices are in French francs. 6.56 FF = 1 Euro = 0.876USD. 
 
Figure 2 shows a 40% drop in the now called reference price since the implementation of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform in 1992.  At the new reference price determined by Agenda 2000, spring 
wheats such as the DNS wheat enter the EU market without duties.  Winter wheats such as HRW and SRW 
are also likely to enter the EU market without duties depending on their CIF prices and exchange rate between 
the US dollar and the Euro. 
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Figure 3 shows the reduction of the intervention prices by wheat category since 1992.  The intervention price 
of durum wheat decreases since 1985 and joins the price of class 2 wheat in 1993, as a result of the 1992 
CAP reform.  The intervention price of high quality wheat (classes E and 1) is set at 5% above the intervention 
price for class 2 wheat, while intervention price of class 3 wheat is set at 10% below the intervention price of 
class 2 wheat. 
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Institutional Price Transmissions 
This study simulates a policy change through a system of demand and supply behavioral equations. This system 
consists of price and direct payment response functions and is briefly described in the following section.  The 
problem described in this section is the one of feeding policy price changes in this system.  As Colman (1985) 
pointed out, simply assuming that changes in agricultural policy prices cause equal changes in market prices, in 
other words, that price transmission is perfect, is not satisfactory.  Recognizing the fact that in the EU, market 
prices normally fluctuate between institutional floor and reference prices according to market conditions, Surry 
(1992) generalized Colman’s approach to determine the impact of those institutional prices on market prices.  
The model has built in flexibility to take into account situations where the market price is bound by either the 
floor or the reference price as well as the case where it lies somewhere between those two limits.  A world 
price is added to the equation, although theoretically it should not affect the internal market price, since, as 
Surry (1992) shows, policy decisions are not independent from it.  Adapting his equation to our model, this   10
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where  k represents the country, i the product differentiated by end use,  j  the country of origin, which in this 
equation is the same as  k, and  t the time index.  
k
ijt p  is the domestic market price, 
k
ijt S  the end of period 
stocks of product  i, 
kf
ijt p  and 
kc
ijt p  the institutional floor and reference prices, and 
w
it p  the world price. 
k









s s + +
=  is a logistic trade regime selecting 
function. This function lies in the interval [ ] 1 , 0 .  Values  0 = L  correspond to a net import situation where the 
reference price is the market-directing price while  1 = L  corresponds to the situation where products are 
bought at floor or intervention price.  Intermediate values correspond to situations somewhere between these 
two extremes. 
Table A1 in the annex presents the estimation results of the transmission coefficients for durum, E, 1, 2 and 3 
class wheat as well as for maize, rapeseed, sunflower and protein crops. This table shows that all transmission 
coefficients except that for protein crops are significant and generally lie somewhat above one half except for 
rapeseed and protein crops. World prices are never significant for wheat and always significant for the other 
crops and take values between 0.2 and 0.4 except for protein crops.  It is not surprising that world price is 
significant for oilseeds, as these markets have received little protection from the outside market within the CAP 
framework.  As mentioned above, these transmission prices serve as a link between policy changes and the 
behavioral model.  Corresponding to the transmission coefficients, elasticities are calculated for 1999 as follow: 
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p g e = 3  with  1999 = t . 
These results are shown in Table 2.  As expected, elasticities of institutional variables are larger for lower 
quality wheat than for higher quality wheat. 
Table 2 Institutional and world price transmission elasticities 
  Wheat class    Substitute / competing products 
Short term elasticity  Durum  E  1  2  3    Maize  Rapeseed  Sunflower  Protein crops 
institutional variables  0.65  0.43  0.53  0.86  0.79    0.83  0.14 0.63  -0.13 
world price  0.11  0.10  0.00  0.00  0.00    0.21  0.35 0.55  -0.49 
Source: from table A1, Annex 
 
The Behavioral Model 
Before specifying the equations of the behavioral model, the demand and supply systems are briefly 
introduced. 
 
Demand of Durum and Wheat Class E, 1, 2 and 3 
The model considered is a three-stage budgeting procedure as suggested in Haley (1995).  In the first stage, 
country requirements, in this case, of milling wheat are determined. In the second stage, total demand for   12
milling wheat is broken down among the different classes of milling wheat, and substitution among those classes 
is assumed to occur.  In the third and last stage, the choice is made concerning the supplier, whether of 
domestic or foreign origin. Again some substitution among the different suppliers is assumed to occur.  Figure 4 
illustrates the three stages of decision considered and indicates as well the main sources of supply of the 
different classes of wheat. 
 
Figure 4. Three-stage demand for milling wheat 
 
 
  Origin of end use milling wheat 
 
 





























EU   13
Figure 4 shows the setting for class E, 1 and 2 wheat. Durum wheat and class 3 wheat are not included in this 
figure as they belong to two different and independent markets. Durum wheat belongs to a market of its own, 
so that stages 1 and 2 are in fact identical. Class 3 wheat is mainly used for animal feed and is in competition 
with feed substitutes as represented in Figure 5.  Feed wheat is also distinguished by origin. 
Figure 5. Three-stage demand for Class 3 feed wheat 
Protein crops 
Rapeseed 
Class 3 Wheat 
Animal feed 
France 
Rest of World 
Maize 
Sunflower   14
Supply of Durum and Wheat Class E, 1, 2 and 3  
In terms of supply, production technology, type of soil and climate mainly define competitiveness for land 
among the different type of agricultural production.  Although there are certainly differences in competitive 
possibilities of production of the different classes of wheat, the analysis in this paper only considers rapeseed 
and protein crops as competitive crops to estimate the supply elasticities for each class of wheat because of 
lack of available degrees of freedom in the regressions.  Durum wheat is treated differently in that maize and 
sunflower are considered as main competitive crops in this case. 
 
The Equations 
The behavioral model equations are defined according to the end use and origin differentiated demand of 
wheat at each decision stage.  In stage one, a global budget is defined for all the products of a given category. 
In stage two, the budget is allocated among the different components or classes (depending on the case) of that 
category. In stage three, a demand is set for the different origins of the produce. The total budget allocated to 








wheat milling D p Y
,
,  2 , 1 , and E i= , 
where, following Armington's definitions, the demand for the differentiated product i produced in country  j  is 
denoted D ijt
k  and 
k
ijt p  denotes its price. 
In stage two, this budget is allocated to the different classes of wheat. Let 
k
i C  denote the set of indexes of 








it D Q  the quantity of class i   15















it D D p p .  Then the budget allocated to class i wheat 



































h e , where e  and h are respectively the price and revenue elasticities of 
demand of class i wheat. 






























m l . 
 
In the case of feed wheat, the relations are identical except that 
k
i C  now denotes feed wheat and all its 
substitutes in demand. These demand equations are functions of changes in own price and in the budget 
allocated to this class of wheat. 
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where the supply in country  k for good  i  (produced in country  k) is denoted 
k
ikt O  and 
k
ikt r  is the direct 
















it a  is product i 's per   16
hectare specific direct payments, 
k
it b  is the set-aside premium and 
k
it c , the fixed set-aside percentage.  These 
are functions of changes in own price and of prices of the substitutes of good i for consumption, and of prices 
of the competing products to cultivation in production.  This formulation allows for adjusting supply responses 
to the additional acreage response from the arable area direct acreage payments implemented in the EU since 
1992.  
ij x , 
ij z  and  ik t  are respectively the elasticities of prices, direct acreage payments and of fixed inputs 




Two different techniques are used to estimate the different elasticities for milling and feed wheat.  In the case of 
milling wheat, conditional demand elasticities are calculated within the multi-stage budgeting scheme 
corresponding to Figure 5 presented above using the AIDS model described below, and, in the case of feed 
wheat and its substitutes or complements, derived demand elasticities are calculated following the translog 
procedure presented in Davis and Jensen (1994). Each of these two methods is now described in turn. 
 
AIDS Model 
Following Alston, Carter, Green and Pick (1990), import and domestic demand elasticities of different milling 
wheat classes and substitutes of our model are estimated using the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) model.  
Armington’s model was not used in spite of its wide use since it is generally found that the homothetic and 
separability hypotheses on which it relies are not verified in practice.  The AIDS model has been widely used in 
various demand and import demand studies, (for example see De Gorter and Meilke 1987; Moschini, Moro   17
and Green, 1994; Moschini 1996; Mohanty and Peterson, 1999).  The advantages of this model are: (i) its 
flexibility which enables a quasi exact representation of consumer preferences at least at a given point, in 
contrast for example to the Rotterdam model, and (ii) the eventual direct use of its estimates to test for the 
theoretical conditions imposed on demand equations (i.e., adding up, symmetry, homogeneity and concavity 
restrictions), and (iii) a resulting non linear Engle curve which allows for income elasticity to vary according to 
income levels. 
 














w  of demand from country  k of a product  i 
differentiated by its origin  j is specified as follows: 
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where  n is the number of sources of supply including domestic and foreign origins, 
k








i q p y  is the total expenditure in country k of the products i from the  j origins, 
k
i P  is a general price deflator specified as follows: 









i p p p P Log log log
2
1 log 0 g a a . 
According to Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), the general price deflator can be approximated by the Stone 







i p w P log log . 
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The adding up, symmetry homogeneity and symmetry conditions respectively require that 
￿ =
j
ij , 1 a  ￿ =
j
ij 0 b , ￿ =
j
ijl 0 g ,   0 = ￿
l
ijl g , and 
ilj ijl g g = .  The negativity condition is verified if 











s =  or equivalently of 
k
ijl c  are negative semi-
definite. 
 
The demand for classes E, 1 and 2 are estimated in a three stage budgeting system. In the first stage of 
budgeting, total expenditure is fixed for all products in the system.  In the second budgeting stage, demand is 
determined for the three classes of wheat, and in the third stage, conditional on the total amount spent for that 
particular class of wheat, the decision is made how to allocate the budget among the different supply origins. 
Durum wheat is estimated separately from and differently than the other 3 wheat classes as justified by 
Mohanty and Peterson (1999) who point out the very little amount of substitutability between durum and the 
other classes of wheat. 
 
The Translog Derived Demand Model 
In contrast to milling wheat, feed wheat enters as one component of animal feed.  It can be substituted for and 
its use depends on a multitude of factors such as the price of meat and the price of feed substitutes.  Although 
the model follows the same graphic representation as that of milling wheat, it is not possible to argue for the 
choice of a budget allocated to each of the feed components given to animals for feed.  Therefore, the 
estimation relies on a technique that takes into account the derived demand rather than a specific budget 
allocated to each product category.  For this purpose, feed wheat’s derived demand is obtained by   19
differentiating a translog profit function.  The translog function is chosen mainly because of the flexibility of the 
function and is specified as follows: 






i i i i
i i
i z d p a
q p
s ln ln b
p
, with  n i i ..., , 1 , = ¢ , 
i i i i ¢ ¢ = b b , 
where  i s is the profit share of i,  m z  is the vector of fixed factors, and  i p ¢ is the vector of all input and output 
prices of the system. 
 
The derived demand system finally distinguishes four products, which are class 3 wheat, maize, rapeseed, and 
protein crops. Other main products such as sunflowers and barley have not been taken into consideration in 
the demand system because of data availability problems (barley) and because of lack of sufficient degrees of 




This paper uses the non-linear least square (NLSQ) estimation method to estimate the demand system in order 
to compute the maximum likelihood estimates of non linear or linear multivariate equations with cross equation 
constraints. 
 
Since both the AIDS and translog are market share demand models, the sum of all shares is necessarily equal 
to one.  For each demand system estimated, one of the equations is dropped to avoid the problem of 
singularity. The estimates are invariant in the equation dropped, and its coefficients are calculated at the end of 
the estimation procedure, making use of the homogeneity constraints. As suggested by Berndt and Savin   20
(1975), each system is corrected for autocorrelation by using the same autocorrelation coefficient for each 
equation. During the estimation procedure, the theoretical demand constraints, especially homogeneity, 
symmetry and concavity are imposed to all complete demand systems. The negativity condition is imposed on 
all systems following the recommendation of Diewart and Wales (1987). This is based on the Cholesky 
decomposition. This method consists in decomposing the symmetric Slutsky matrices of substitution  ij c  into 
two triangular matrices  A such that  ' AA cij - = , and where  ' A  is the transpose matrix of  A. When imposing 
concavity, equation (2) is substituted into equation (1) resulting in a highly non-linear model not always very 
easy to estimate. 
 
The elasticities are calculated as follows:  
For the conditional demand elasticities, following Green and Alston (1990), the formulas are: 





h + =1  
where  i h is the expenditure elasticity and  ij h  is the uncompensated price elasticity. The compensated elasticity 
of demand 
*
ij n  is derived from the Slutsky equation.  For the derived demand system, the elasticities are 
calculated as follows: 
i ij j ij s s / b h + =  for cross elasticities, and  i ii i ii s s / 1 b h + + - =  for own-price elasticities. 
An asymptotic student test is used to test the significance of the estimates of the elasticities at different levels of 
significance. 
 
Results and Interpretation   21
 
The elasticities in Table 3 are almost all significantly different from zero at a 5% level of significance. Most 
exceptions occur in class 1 wheat. Expenditure elasticities indicate normal goods for French and EU class 2 
wheat, neutral goods for USA class E wheat and EU class 1 wheat, and inferior goods for USA class 1 wheat, 
EU class 3 wheat and Canadian class E. The inferiority of certain goods can be explained because of 
substitution relationships between the different products of the system in such a way that an increased in the 
total expenditure of the system results in a reallocation depending on the relative preference of consumers for 
different products. Consumers can therefore choose to increase consumption of a good to the detriment of 
another one in the system.   22
Table 3 Third stage uncompensated end use and origin differentiated demand 
elasticities for wheat and substitutes in France 
  Origin   











































Class E wheat 





































  -0.02 
(0.94) 
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*** 
(0.00) 

















      -0.57
* 
(0.09) 
Source: from table A2, Annex 
1 figures in parenthesis are standard errors, ***: 1% of significance, **: 5% significance, *: 10% significance. 
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Table 4 Second stage uncompensated end use and origin differentiated demand 
elasticities for wheat and substitutes in France 
  Class 3 
wheat 
Maize  Rapeseed  Protein crops 











































Table  3 shows that own price elasticities have expected negative signs.  Wheat markets differ quite 
considerably from one another in consumption behavior, especially class E wheat from the others.  Table 4 
shows that class 3 wheat, maize and rapeseed are substitutes for one another on the French market. This is not 
surprising since these products are all used to supply energy in animal feed. Maize and rapeseed appear to be 
complements, although the elasticities are non significantly different from zero. 
Compared to the elasticities found in Mohanty and Peterson (1999), the one presented here are generally 
higher than the one’s found in the paper.  This is not surprising since here wheat is disaggregated according to 
its different qualities, and it is to be expected that each class taken separately respond more than the product 
considered as a whole. 
 
Supply Elasticities 
Supply elasticities are computed from estimates derived from a normalized quadratic profit function following 
Moro and Sckokaï (1999) applied to dynamic supply systems. These include per hectare production direct 
















kt ik t i i i
N
i
t i i i i it r p q n j d a a  
Where  N  denotes the total number of product and variable factors in the system, 
t i p ¢
_
 is the normalized product or input price, 
t i r ¢
_
 is the direct payment to production 
  kt v  are the fixed factors in production 
 
numeroter les equations 
 
Because of the poor result obtained with this specification, we use a general dynamic specification of this 
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k d l  
D is the difference operator, 
0 d  is the vector of parameters in the static normalized quadratic supply system. 
In the final estimated system, one lag is introduced on market prices and quantities only, based on the 
hypothesis that farmers produce according to former prices and former quantities. Because of the fact that 
production direct payments are known before the production decision process, no lag is introduced on these 
prices.   25
Because of lack of data on variable input and on some fixed factors, only product prices and direct acreage 
payments are included in the regressions.  Also because of small degrees of freedom and multicollinearity 
problems among market wheat class prices, we cannot estimate one unique supply system made up of the four 
wheat classes and their competitive products.  The five individual systems are estimated separately, and 
rapeseed and protein crops are included in willing and feed wheat equations while sunflower and maize are 
included in the durum equation. 
The estimation of each of the five systems is performed using the least square method of estimation, which 
provide consistent maximum likelihood estimates. The homogeneity, symmetry and convexity conditions are 
imposed to the different systems. Convexity is imposed by using the Cholesky decomposition as described in 
the demand system. 
In the supply equations for wheat E, 1, 2 and 3, prices and direct payments are normalized with the protein 
crops price, while for durum wheat, sunflower price is used to normalize the prices. The elasticities are 
computed for the year 1998, simply by differentiating the supply equations with respect to prices and 
compensatory payments. 
 
Results and Interpretation 
Table 5 shows that own price elasticities of supply are always positive and significantly different from zero most 
of the times.  The same holds true for elasticities of direct acreage payments to production.  The most 
important results in terms of their influence on the simulation results are the large values of elasticities associated 
to the direct acreage payments of production of colza and protein crops.  The elasticities are large and the 
direct payments to production of those products dropped quite significantly.   26
 
 
Table 5 End use differentiated supply price elasticities for wheat and competitive products in 
France 
  Price    Acreage payment 
Wheat Class  Wheat  Colza  Protein 
crops 
Maize  Sunflower    Wheat  Colza  Protein 
crops 
Maize  Sunflower 










   
                       












   
                       












   
                       












   
                       
Durum wheat  2.45*** 
(0.04) 




  4.17*** 
(0.00) 




Source: from table A3, Annex 
 
 
The Partial Equilibrium Displacement Model 
The price transmission elasticities derived earlier in the paper are used to calculate the price change induced by 





















+ = 3  
 
In turn, the price difference calculated from the transmission elasticities are fed into the demand and supply 



























































These equations serve as a basis for the analysis of a policy change on domestic supply and demand of cereals 























ikt NP D  represents the change in domestic excess supply.  Excess supply will either be stocked or 
exported while excess demand will either lead to a decrease in stocks or an increase in imports of that good. 
 
Agricultural Policy Instruments and Simulation 
Table 6 shows the main elements of the simulated policy scenario.  As planned in Agenda 2000, cereal 
intervention prices are cut and arable area direct acreage payments are increased.  EU trade is also subject to 
market access and export competition provisions agreed to in the Agricultural Agreement of the Uruguay 
Round. 
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Table 6 Agricultural policy instruments and simulation scenarios 
Instruments  Policy Scenario 
Agenda 2000   
   
Cereal intervention price   -15% 
Cereal reference price  Less than 155% times intervention price 
   
Average per hectare specific direct payments:   
Wheat and maize  +16% 
Rapeseed and sunflower  -33% 
Protein crops  -8% 
   
Set aside premium  -8% 
Fixed set aside percentage  -17% 
     
Uruguay Round Trade Agreements  EU  France 
     
Minimum wheat market access (in tons)  1 767 000  390 000 
a 
Zero tariff wheat contingent (in tons)  350 000  77 000 
a 
     
Maximum volume of subsidized exports (in tons)  14 400 000  7 000 000 
b 
Maximum value of exports subsidies (billion French francs)  8.44
  3.83 
c 
a The EU commitment is distributed to France according to its share of consumption in the EU.  France’s contingent=22% EU contingent. 
b The EU commitment is distributed to France according to its share of exports in the EU in volume, i.e. France’s contingent=56% EU 
contingent. 
c The EU commitment is distributed to France according to its share of exports in the EU in value, i.e. France’s contingent=45% EU 
contingent 
 
Pour MURIEL: quels sont les chiffres UR POUR LA france… 
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Simulation Results and Interpretation 
Price, Demand and Supply Changes 
Table 7 shows the effects of Agenda 2000 policy on institutional prices.  Intervention prices where reduced by 
15%, and assuming that the new reference price is set at 155% times the intervention price, the reference price 
for durum wheat is reduced by 17% and the reference price for the different classes of wheat is reduced by 
values ranging from 12 for high quality wheat to 18% for low quality wheat.  Notice that the reference price 
only takes effect if the CIF price of a cereal is below the reference value.  If not, the good enters the EU 
without import levies.  Table 7 shows that wheat and maize production also benefit from a 16% increase in 
direct payment to production, while oilseeds and protein crops receive a sharp decrease in production direct 
payments of 32 and 10% respectively.  These changes in institutional prices are transmitted to market prices as 
shown earlier in the paper, and the new reference prices transmit directly to extra-European imports as long as 
their CIF price is below the reference price. Price transmission is assumed to be the same for France’s 
domestic market prices and intra-European import prices (of the same class product) as these prices are 
affected by the same policy changes throughout the European Union. 
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Table 7 Institutional Price Changes 
Values in French francs 
Institutional price  Initial value 
a  Final value 
b  % Change    Initial value 
a  Final value 
b  % Change 
  Intervention price    Reference price 
Durum wheat  797  678  -15%    1263  1050  -17% 
Class E wheat  813  691  -15%    1212  1071  -12% 
Class 1 wheat  813  691  -15%    1212  1071  -12% 
Class 2 wheat  797  678  -15%    1212  1050  -13% 
Class 3 wheat  757  644  -15%    1212  998  -18% 
Maize  797  678  -15%    904  904  0% 
Rapeseed  0  0  0%    1064  1064  0% 
Sunflower  0  0  0%    0  0  0% 
Protein crops  702  702  0%    0  0  0% 
  Set aside direct acreage payments    Crop specific hectare direct payments 
Durum wheat  2631  2421  -8%    2631  3052  16% 
Class E wheat  2631  2421  -8%    2000  2320  16% 
Class 1 wheat  2631  2421  -8%    2000  2320  16% 
Class 2 wheat  2631  2421  -8%    2000  2320  16% 
Class 3 wheat  2631  2421  -8%    3628  4209  16% 
Maize  2631  2421  -8%    2329  2701  16% 
Rapeseed  2631  2421  -8%    3071  2057  -33% 
Sunflower  2631  2421  -8%    3573  2394  -33% 
Protein crops  2631  2421  -8%    2890  2658  -8% 
  Effective set aside rate    Compensatory direct payments 
Durum wheat  10.6%  8.8%  -17%    2943  3285  12% 
Class E wheat  10.6%  8.8%  -17%    2312  2554  10% 
Class 1 wheat  10.6%  8.8%  -17%    2312  2554  10% 
Class 2 wheat  10.6%  8.8%  -17%    2312  2554  10% 
Class 3 wheat  10.6%  8.8%  -17%    3940  4442  13% 
Maize  10.6%  8.8%  -17%    2641  2935  11% 
Rapeseed  10.6%  8.8%  -17%    3383  2291  -32% 
Sunflower  10.6%  8.8%  -17%    3885  2627  -32% 
Protein crops  10.6%  8.8%  -17%    3201  2892  -10% 
a 1998 for maize, rapeseed and protein crops, prices in French francs per ton 
b The final value is given by the maximum of 155 percent of the intervention price and the CIF Rotterdam. 
 
Table 8 shows that all wheat and maize domestic market prices drop following the change in policy while 
oilseed and protein crops domestic market prices do not change.  It is therefore not surprising to find a general 
increase in demand for all wheat consumed in France as it appears in Table 9 below.  Some estimated cross 
elasticities do, however, predict a decrease in intra-European and Canadian class E wheat imports, as well as 
a decrease in intra-European imports of class 3 wheat, however these decreases are more than compensated 
by increases in demand of alternative sources.   31
Table 8 Changes in Market and Entry Price 
Values in French francs 
Product  Origin  Initial value  Final value  % Change 
Durum wheat  France  960  861  -10% 
  Intra-EU  1310  1174  -10% 
  Extra-EU  1263  1050  -17% 
Class E wheat  France  1559  1472  -6% 
  Intra-EU  1077  1017  -6% 
  USA  1229  1071  -13% 
  Canada  1279  1071  -16% 
Class 1 wheat  France  778  716  -8% 
  Intra-EU  1352  1245  -8% 
  USA  1229  1071  -13% 
Class 2 wheat  France  771  678  -12% 
  Intra-EU  1077  948  -12% 
Class 3 wheat  France  820  721  -12% 
  Intra-EU  1352  1188  -12% 
Maize  France  904  800  -11% 
Rapeseed  France  1241  1241  0% 
Sunflower  France  1342  1342  0% 
Protein Crops  France  7200  7200  0% 
 
Table 9 Changes in demand 
Values in ‘000 tons 
Wheat Class  Origin  Initial value  Final value  % Change 
Durum  France  440  481  9% 
  Intra-EU  495  548  11% 
  Extra-EU  18  21  16% 
Class E  France  70  80  14% 
  Intra-EU  191  183  -4% 
  USA  21  26  21% 
  Canada  3  0  -100% 
  Rest of world 
a  2  2  0% 
Class 1  France  5136  5543  8% 
  Intra-EU  23  23  1% 
  USA  1  2  83% 
Class 2  France  581  650  12% 
  Intra-EU  16  17  9% 
Class 3  France  10482  11758  12% 
  Intra-EU  23  22  -7% 
a Not included in simulation   32
Supply side results appear in Table 10.  Among wheats, supply of class 3 wheat is less affected by policy 
change than the other classes of wheat.  However, high quality wheat supply (classes E and 1) increases 
proportionately more than lower quality wheat (classes 2 and 3), although class 2 wheat is the single class that 
benefits the most from the policy change.  Durum wheat is more favorably affected by the new policy than the 
other wheats. 
 
The last two columns of Table 10 show the decomposition of the change in terms of price and direct payment 
effects separately.  As expected, change in supply induced by domestic market price decrease is negative.  
Low quality wheat production decreases proportionately more than high quality wheat production. 
Interestingly, according to the estimates, direct payments to production more than offsets the price effects 
leading to a net increase of production in all classes of wheat. 
 
Table 10 Changes in supply 
Values in ‘000 tons 
Class of Wheat  Initial value  Final value  Total % change  % Change 
accounted for 
price change 
% Change accounted for 
change in direct payments 
to production 
Durum 1542 1917 24%  -9% 33%
Class E 93 104 12%  -5% 17%
Class 1 9590 10565 10%  -7% 17%
Class 2 13667 15520 14%  -12% 26%
Class 3 12112 12856 6%  -13% 20%
 
Since we have an increase as well in demand and as in supply, the net effect on imports and exports is not 
known in advance, and so the purpose of this study.  Table 11 shows an overall decrease in imports of class E 
wheat, however, an increase in extra-European imports.  Class 1 wheat imports increase slightly, the difference 
imported from outside the European Union.  Class 2 wheat intra-European imports increase and class 3 wheat   33
intra-European imports decrease.  The market for class 3 wheat shows an impressive drop in exports.  
Exports increase in all the other classes of wheat.  The increase in durum wheat exports is quite noticeable. 
 
Table 11 Changes in imports and exports 
Values in ‘000 tons 
  Exports    Imports 
  Initial exports  Final exports  % Change    Initial imports  Final imports  % Change 
Durum wheat  1102  1436  30%    513  569  11% 
Intra-EU  524  683      495  548  11% 
Extra-EU  578  753      18  21  16% 
Class E wheat  23  24  6%    217  211  -3% 
Intra-EU  23  24      191  183  -4% 
Extra-EU  0  0      27  28  6% 
Class 1 wheat  4454  5022  13%    24  25  4% 
Intra-EU  1291  1455      23  23  1% 
Extra-EU  3164  3567      1  2  72% 
Class 2 wheat  13087  14869  14%    16  17  9% 
Intra-EU  7836  8903      16  17  9% 
Extra-EU  5251  5966      0  0  0% 
Class 3 wheat  1630  1098  -33%    23  22  -7% 
Intra-EU  976  657      23  22  -7% 
Extra-EU  654  440      0  0  0% 
Total intra-EU  10650  11722 10%  748 793 6% 
Total extra-EU  9647  10726 11%  46 51 11% 
Total extra-EU 
(10
6 French francs) 
7600  7570  -0.5%    60
  61
  2% 
 
More importantly, overall extra-European exports increase by 11% due to Agenda 2000.  The question that 
arises is whether or not France can respect the Uruguay Round trade limits imposed it.  Of course, the limits 
are imposed on the European Union as a whole, so, in order to answer this question, the burden of trade 
restrictions on France were distributed proportionately to its share of exports in 1999.  According to these 
figures, France cannot export more that 7.5 million tons of subsidized wheat.  In 1999 it already exported 9.6 
million tons and our model predicts that it will export 10.7 million tons in 2000-2001, an increase of 11%.  The 
problem is that we do know how much French exports were actually subsidized.  However, our figures   34
indicate that, in any case, the trade restrictions will be more binding than in the past.  France will either have to 
find markets for its non-subsidized exports or rely on intervention stock purchases to absorb the surplus.  
However, there are some indications of some offsetting factors that could come as a help to meet the Uruguay 
Round commitments.  For example, it is not clear that supply in other EU countries will respond as much as in 
France to the new policy, since not all countries, especially in the north, have such favorable production 
environment to high quality wheat.  So, as market prices fall and as supply increases proportionately more in 
France than in other European countries, first of all, France can find a larger outlet in the EU for its excess 
supply due to a general increase in demand, and being a relative more important producer within the EU, we 
would have allocated to France a greater share of the Uruguay Round export commitments than we currently 
do.  Another offsetting factor could reside in the increasing trend in world prices denominated in the European 
currency, not so much because of an increase in foreign wheat prices per se, but because of the low value of 
the European currency.  This means that, all things equal, the EU doesn’t need to spend as much to subsidize 
its exports enabling it to sell more before reaching the UR export commitments 
It is worth noting at this point that the increase in exports is an undesirable side effect of the direct payments to 
production.  These estimates confirm what many researchers have hinted in the past (Guyomard, Le Mouel 
and Surry (1993), Moro and Sckokai (1999)), that direct payments to production are not completely 




This paper analyses the effects of Agenda 2000 on supply, demand and trade of origin and end-use quality   35
differentiated wheat in France.  The policy change is to bring a reduction in wheat prices, therefore increasing 
demand and in principle decreasing supply, however, direct transfers to production more than offsets the price 
effect and so, in the end, supply increases as well.  The overall effect on imports and exports is positive as well.  
Exports increase about as much within the EU than outside the EU.  However, extra-EU imports increase 
more than intra-EU imports.  The increase in intra-EU imports will help France keep up with its minimum entry 
requirements as defined in the Uruguay Round Agreements, however the increase in exports will be more 
difficult to meet. 
The results of this paper can be enhanced by making use of a dynamic AIDS model as proposed in Mohanty 
and Peterson (1999) jointly with the dynamic supply system to distinguish short and long term effects.  Future 
work on this paper will include a sensitivity analysis on key parameters such as demand and supply elasticities, 
using a stochastic partial equilibrium displacement model as proposed in Davis and Espinoza (2000).  Another 
direction of improvement will be to expand the model to other key EU countries such as Germany, United 
Kingdom and Italy and, eventually, to the whole EU.   36
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Annex 
 
Table A1. Institutional and world price transmission 
(a, b) 
  Dependent Variables 
  Wheat Class    Substitute / competing products 
Coefficient  Durum  E  1  2  3    Maize  Rapeseed  Sunflower  Protein 
crops 



























































































Export regime  -0.468 
(2.34) 
  -10.9 
(26.5) 





     
Net exports  0.00237 
(0.00443) 





         


















19  19  19  18  15    18  18  19  18 
Log Likelihood  -115  -112  -102  -997  -79    -103  -124  -129  -116 
R
2  0.92  0.92  0.94  0.87  0.95    0.91  0.94  0.96  0.91 
Adjusted R
2  0.86  0.88  0.91  0.83  0.92    0.89  0.91  0.94  0.88 




 *** Indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively   39
 
Table A2. Different wheat class demand coefficient estimates
(a) 

















  -0.019 
(0.20) 
0.992  1.41 
  2=EU  0.483 
(0.00) 




  0.008 
(0.59) 
0.997  1.37 




  0.011 
(0.00) 
0.986  1.23 












0.996  0.28 
  2= UE  0.388 
(0.00) 








0.995  1.98 
  3=USA  0.082 
(0.00) 






0.848  1.00 
  4=Canada  0.010 
(0.44) 




0.901  0.972 








  0.021 
(0.00) 
0.762  0.85 
  2= UE  -0.050 
(0.01) 




  -0.007 
(0.00) 
0.717  0.78 
  3=US  -0.075 
(0.11) 
    -0.012 
(0.57) 
  -0.018 
(0.02) 
0.800  1.09 






    0.003 
(0.00) 
0.998  0.455 
  2= UE  0.010 
(0.00) 
  0.006 
(0.00) 
    -0.003 
(0.00) 
0.972  1.00 






    0.007 
(0.00) 
0.854  0.85 
  2= UE  0.004 
(0.00) 
  -0.02 
(0.18) 
    -0.007 
(0.00) 
0.901  0.54 










  0.459  0.38 
  2=Maize  0.412 
(0.00) 






  0.020  0.37 
  3=protein crops  0.141 
(0.00) 




  0.732  0.38 
  4=Rapeseed  0.056 
(0.00) 
      -0.077 
(0.32) 
     
Estimated by Rabelais Yankam, Université Catholique de Louvain 
(a) Figures in parenthesis are asymptotic p-values   40
 
Table A3. End use differentiated supply price estimated coefficients for wheat and 
Competitive in France
(a, b) 
  Supply Systems 






























    -1.355
*** 
(0.00) 
    -1.61
** 
(0.01) 
    -0.451
*** 
(0.00) 




                           
Current price 
coefficients
                           
Wheat 1.607 
(0.94) 
    23
*** 
(0.01) 
    3.00 
(0.99) 
    17101
*** 
(0.00) 





























                           
One lag price 
Coefficients 











































  2353.85 
(0.58) 
-5318 























































































R² 0.898  0.969    0.967  0.778    0.816  0.936    0.942  0.977    0.993  0.952 
DW 1.87  1.8    1.83  1.45    1.13  1.46    2.4  2.06    2.33  2.01 
Estimated by Rabelais Yankam, Université Catholique de Louvain 




 *** Indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively 
 